Abstract
This commentary argues that Ted Cohen's claim that Kant confuses logical and aesthetic judgements (in Three problems in Kant's aesthetics, Bristish Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 42, 2002, pp. 1-12) can be countered by a somewhat different reading of Kant's argument in 8 of the «Critique of judgement». Cohen construes Kant's argument as an inductive generalization based on common properties. I suggest, instead, that Kant distinguishes between judgements of taste, which do not require concepts, and logical generalizations that are based directly on experience and that do allow concepts. Beauty is used equivocally, but that frees Kant from the charge of logical error or self-contradiction.
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