Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction (review)

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS 145 Salim Kemal. Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. Pp. vi + 197. Cloth, NP. In this relatively short book Kemal provides a comprehensive yet accessible introduction to Kant's aesthetic theory. The topics discussed include Kant's rejection of empiricist and rationalist theories, the four moments of the "Analytic of the Beautiful," the deduction or justification of judgments of taste, and the context of Kant's aesthetic theory. FoLlowing his account of Kant's deduction, Kemal provides a survey of other commentaries. A bibliographical note refers to more extensive bibliographies. The striking contrast between the tightly structured "Analytic of the Beautiful" and the rest of the "Critique of AestheticJudgment" virtuallydetermines the course of a commentary . It must give an account of Kant's deduction ofjudgments of taste and of the relevance to Kant's theory of a number of topics subsequendy introduced, e.g., the relation of natural beauty and fine art and the interest attached tojudgments of taste. The problem of the deduction is pervasive. Since Kant there relies upon two logical peculiarities ofjudgments of taste disclosed by his analysis, a commentator's handling of it will be reflected in his interpretation of the "Analytic." His decision as to where the deduction ends will influence the relevance he finds in the various topics later introduced. Given the single-minded thrust of Kemars commentary, the reader is well prepared for his handling of the deduction and for his treatment of natural beauty and fine art. Kemars position is that in Section 3o, "Deduction of Judgments of Taste," Kant is concerned only with the transcendental possibility of such judgments. In apparently reopening the question of their justification, his concern is, instead, with successfully making actual judgments of taste. Kemal's position is reflected in his treatment of two crucial issues. As for the sensu~ communis on which judgments of taste are based, he finds Kant progressing through three senses of the term, ending with that of an ideal norm. As for the question of whether pleasure precedes the activity of judging or the reverse, the answer to which Kant calls "the key" to the critique of taste, Kemal maintains that the activity of judging involves a double process of reflection, the first estimating an object that occasions pleasure, the second estimating that one's state of mind is communicable. This second reflection, on the origin of one's pleasure, is fallible and can only be confirmed by the agreement of others. In anticipation, Kemal maintains that the "disinterest" of the first moment does not exclude all concepts, but only the determinate concepts that would serve to identify objects. Kant, admittedly, reserves his discussion of the expressiveness of beautiful objects (or aesthetic ideas), but formalists and New Critics have distorted his position. Although the expressiveness of beautiful natural objects is said to parallel that of fine art, the only idea expressed there is, apparently, that of "the finality of nature." Kemars interest is primarily in art and the sort of communication made possible by it. Throughout the first three moments, his stress on the activity of judging and its putative communicability is intended to make the object peripheral. The objectjudged beautiful comes into play in the fourth moment, having to do with the necessity of judgments of taste. Here Kemal distinguishes between a postulated and fallible "subjective necessity" or universalizability and the "objective necessity" of actual judgments of ~46 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:1 JANUARY 199 4 taste, in which the subject goes beyond expecting the agreement of others and, knowing that he has made a judgment of taste, demands their agreement. Since judgments of taste lack logical or evidential necessity one subject can confirm that he has in fact made such ajudgment only by getting another to feel the pleasure he has experienced, and this he can do by pointing to features of the work. In order to provide a noncircular account of the demand for agreement, Kant looks to the necessity of making judgments of taste. He needs a reason, extrinsic to taste itself, for the importance of making such judgments, which he finds in their relation to...