Cognitive science and the language/ cognition distinction

Abstract

Abstract At the heart of Davis' expository cloud I recognize a claim with which I agree wholeheartedly: and that is, that advances in the study of disorders of the higher mental fitnctions wdl draw heavily on what is known about the operation of mental systems, in the intact state. If one looks at where advances have been made in neuropsychology over the last decade, the evidence in favour is abundant; the sharpening of questions and increased sophistication of investigative approach in aphasia research, for example, have followed fairly directly from its adoption of the insights and method of linguistics and psycholinguistics. But Davis has something more specific in mind than a restatement of this now familiar theme (d. Arbib and Caplan's (1980) plea that ‘neurolinguistics must be computational’). He proposes that an emergent ‘cognitive science’ will specify how our pre-theoretic notions of language and cognition are to be translated into theoretical constructs, and how these willstand in relation to each other. An applied Cognitive science will deliver, in turn. a basis for disentangling aphasia and dementia, for deciding what to call the various retraining programmes which are increasingly a part of therapy, and even, surprisingly, for spelling out the job descriptions of clinical practitioners. Benefits, indeed!