Abstract
In this paper I look at three theories regarding the exact nature of cognitive state transitions. I briefly dismiss dynamic systems theory as providing no clearly specified explananda consistent with notions of cognition. For remainder of the paper, I focus upon ‘classical’ cognitive science and dynamic computationalism. I present and criticize the two most prominent arguments in the literature. I suggest that proponents of each of these arguments in the literature misunderstand or misapply the technical notions to which they appeal. I conclude the paper by arguing that properly understood, all the types of arguments in the literature support dynamic computationalism.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
