Coercive Diplomacy Gone Wrong: Interactive Leader Psychology and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Abstract

Abstract The paper proposes the leader interaction framework for understanding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. President Putin’s decision to use force in Ukraine was influenced but not predetermined by Russia’s worsened security position or the nature of its autocratic regime, as stressed by realist and liberal theories, respectively. Rather, the war came as a byproduct of coercive diplomacy and its failure. Putin counted on political pressures and military buildup near Ukraine as bargaining tools for persuading the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to stop the process of expansion, leaving Ukraine out of the Western alliance. Putin also wanted Kyiv to recognize the autonomy of Donbas. He was not initially prepared to go to war over the status of Donbas and hoped that a mixture of diplomacy and pressure would resolve the issue. The paper identifies several stages of Russia’s coercive diplomacy and argues that the interaction between Russian, Western, and Ukrainian leaders increased, not reduced, the likelihood of a military conflict in Ukraine.