Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a spatial model of coalition formation with data from Dutch elections and with theoretical results. First, we study different procedures of coalition formation. The model shows that procedure plays an important role in reaching a coalition agreement and that political parties do not necessarily benefit from being a firstmover. Moreover, it is shown that a decrease in a party's flexibility can be beneficial in coalition negotiations. Furthermore, we find that certain power sharing tactics do not always lead to an agreement that is in a party's advantage. The main message put forward is that the process of coalition formation plays a more important role than is usually acknowledged in literature and practice.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
