Co dekonstrukcja może zaproponowaćetyce środowiskowej?

About the Authors

Reviewed by: Ecological Ethics: An Introduction David Keller (bio) Patrick Curry , Ecological Ethics: An Introduction . Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007, 173pages. Were I in Bath having drinks with Patrick Curry, we would have much to agree about. Explaining his choice of title of his book, Ecological Ethics, he rightly points out that the more common descriptor "environmental ethics" presupposes a dualism between human beings and the nonhuman environment—an assumption which is itself anthropocentric (p. 4). For philosophers interested in studying the human/ nonhuman dynamic, the legitimacy of anthropocentrism is itself an open question. Because the word 'ecology' treats humans, as biota, as integral parts of ecological systems, the phrase "ecological ethics" is less presumptuous and hence more accurate. The word 'ecological' also has the benefit of conveying the message that the subject is notgoing to involve extending moral considerability from humans out into the "environment." Instead, ecological systems as the locus of value provide the starting point for the elaboration of ethics (p. 2). For Curry, as for Leopold (1960) and Callicott (1989), "ecological community" is coextensive with the ethical community. To correlate the ethical community with the biotic community within the rubric of "ecological ethics" is nothing novel. Curry's claim that "there is something ancient about an ecological ethic" (p. 7) got me thinking: [End Page 153]prior to Abrahamic monotheism and Greek rationalism, ancient peoples, particularly nomadic hunter-gatherers, probably considered themselves as integral parts of what encompassed them, moving with herds, in concert with meteorological and seasonal changes, seeing themselves as one amongst other living beings. They probably did not see themselves apart from the "environment" as we have learned to do. Then with the advent of agriculture, linear furrows and controlled inundations must have fostered an addictive sense of security from flood and famine. Later, the innovations of industrial civilization further distanced us from the caprice of nature's wild vicissitudes. Yet that comfort comes at the expense of lost awareness of our responsibilities as bioticcitizens. Therefore, Curry says, following Sylvan (1973), we need a new ecological ethic since traditional Western morality "is no longer up to the job" (ibid.). Curry remarks that ethics, cast in this light, is not something "optional," something to be addressed after one's belly is full, debts settled, and lodging secured. Rather, ethics cuts directly to the core of human action, of all human activity (p. 5)—a claim reminiscent of Socrates' exhortation to Thrasymachus that it is no small matter that they are discussing, nothing of less importance than the right way to live one's life (Plato 2005, p. 603). Over the first sips of ale, I would praise him for giving his book a simple and straightforward structure that makes a challenging subject accessible, especially to students. After laying down the groundwork of basic concepts in moral philosophy (chapter 3)—objectivism versus relativism, the problem of the is/ought gap, religious morality and environmental philosophy (domination, stewardship, and managerialism), and virtue and rule-based ethics (chapter 4)—Curry addresses axiology (chapter 5). Are humans the sole locus of value (anthropocentrism), or are there other entities worthy of some sort of moral consideration who themselves do not carry the burden of moral responsibility (zoocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism)? Curry answers the latter in the affirmative, arguing that ontological interconnectedness of humans with other living beings within ecological systems discloses that something greater than humanity is the locus of value (p. 46). The most useful part of the book for my students out in Utah would be the middle chapters (6–8) in which Curry casts degrees of nonanthropocentrism [End Page 154]in shades of green. These shades range from light green or "shallow" anthropocentric ethics such Bookchin's Social Ecology (p. 50), Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics (pp. 52–54), and mainstream environmentalism (p. 51), through medium green ethics based on the extension of traditional human-oriented moral philosophy to nonhumans such as Singer's Animal Liberation (pp. 56–59), Regan's Animal Rights (pp. 59–60), and Taylor's Biocentrism (pp. 60–62). Curry proceeds to the dark green ethics of ecocentrism, such as Land Ethics (pp. 65–68), the Gaia Hypothesis (pp. 68–71...

This volume introduces the most important ideas in animal ethics and builds on a critical dialogue emerging at the intersection of animal rights, environmental ethics, and religious studies. In search of Consistency examines the work of influential scholars Tom Regan (animal rights), Peter Singer (utilitarian ethics), Andrew Linzey (theologian), and Paul Taylor (environmental ethics), and explores ethics and animals across six world religions (Indigenous faiths, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam). In Search of Consistency sheds light on 'the sanctity of life' by means of an intriguing moral theory, 'The Minimize Harm Maxim', rooted in the time-honoured moral ideals of impartiality and consistency. This volume questions what it means to be human and challenges our assumed place in the universe...worth every penny and then some! It is never for a moment boring. The author has created something of lasting value...(Norm Phelps)

Climate Change and Green Burial

As an environmental philosopher I had long been aware of dilemmas between animal ethics and ecological ethics, but now, as the manager of my own biodiversity reserve, I was facing these dilemmas in a more gut-wrenching and complex form than I had ever encountered in the classroom. Pressured by environmental authorities to cull kangaroos on my property, in the name of ecological ethics, I started thinking about the very meaning of ethics, its origins in the evolution of society and its material and metaphysical presuppositions. Two different conceptions of the normative root of society emerged, the deontic conception, appropriate within the material and metaphysical framework of hunter-gatherer societies, and the axial conception, appropriate within the framework of 'civilization', viz the agrarian societies that evolved into the urbanindustrial formations of the modern era. The axial conception, based on empathy, aligned with our modern conception of ethics, and underlay our contemporary sense of animal ethics. 'Ecological ethics', on the other hand, seemed to be obscurely underpinned by the deontic conception, and was not ethical at all in the axial sense, and was moreover mismatched, normatively speaking, with the material and metaphysical realities of modern societies. A different set of practices from those currently prescribed by environmental authorities needs to be devised to meet both the ethical and ecological requirements of our contemporary natural environment. Keywords animal ethics, ecological ethics, origins of ethics, wildlife ethics, kangaroos I ANIMALS ETHICS VERSUS ECOLOGICAL ETHICS? When I took up residence at my new 350-acre property on the shoulder of a little stone mountain in Central Victoria last year, I thought I was fairly well prepared to manage it for conservation. I had taught environmental ethics for twenty years and was looking forward excitedly to putting theory into practice. It was straightforward. I truly revered all life. I had devoted an entire academic career to this cause. My environmental ethic was my raison d'etre. Now at last I had a place where I could regenerate the bush and offer sanctuary for wildlife. However, things were not to be so simple. As soon as I walked through the gate of my new haven, I found myself slapped in the face with one ethical dilemma after another, till I felt punch-drunk and bewildered. It was as though the tough old no-nonsense mountain thought to itself, let's put this little whitefella upstart through her paces and see how her classroom ethics stacks up against the life-and-death, anything-but-merry-go-round of the real 'environment'. First it was the rabbits. The mountain, being a granite outcrop, is a headquarters for rabbits. There is quite good remnant vegetation on the property but no further progress could be made towards restoration until the rabbits were brought under control. I had seen the results of uncontrolled rabbit infestation in the past: a kind of earth leprosy, with vegetation stripped off and land collapsed in on itself, rotting and eroding. Rabbits are of course themselves innocent and totally adorable little creatures, but I could not manage the property for biodiversity unless they were controlled. 'Controlled' meant killed, since no other methods for controlling rabbit populations are currently available. But what method of killing was appropriate in the circumstances? I was lucky enough to obtain a grant for rabbit management almost as soon as I took up residence on the property. An environmental services contractor was recommended to me. His preferred method was to bait with the poison, 1080, via treated grain scattered broad-scale across the entire property. He assured me that this method was safe for non-target species - well, apart from (swamp) wallabies, who were 'greedy', he said, and foolishly stuffed themselves on the grain. There might therefore be one or two wallaby casualties, but this was a minor ecological deficit - it was just the price you paid for bringing the land back into environmental production. …

[T]he Precautionary Principle still has neither a commonly accepted definition nor a set of criteria to guide its implementation. ‘There is,’ Freestone ... cogently observes, ‘a certain paradox in the widespread and rapid adoption of the Precautionary Principle:’ While it is applauded as a ‘good thing,’ no one is quite sure about what it really means or how it might be implemented. Advocates foresee precaution developing into ‘the fundamental principle of environmental protection policy at [all] scales.’ ... Sceptics, however, claim its popularity derives from its vagueness; that it fails to bind anyone to anything or resolve any of the deep dilemmas that characterize modern environmental policy making. 1

A critical review of environmental philosophy and environmental ethics is discussed in relation to the idea of sustainable development. The article makes reference to 19th century influences that inspired thought orientated towards protecting the natural environment, and then presents the stages of the development of ecological philosophy, the main standpoints and their representatives. The main features of Polish eco‐philosophical thought are presented together with an outline of the most significant achievements of these disciplines on a global scale. The influence of environmental philosophy and ethics on social aspects of sustainable development is also presented. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Aesthetics of Nature

A central task of environmental ethics, which have been arising since 1960s, is to extend the objects of moral concern beyond the individuals of Homo sapiens. (Here, it involves the issue of the boundary of environmental ethics. In a narrow sense, an environmental ethic must grant moral concern to holistic environmental objects (such as ecosystems). On the other hand, if we broadly define the environmental ethic as an ethic that shows moral concern not limited to Homo sapiens and its individuals only, then, these “generalized” environmental ethics include Peter Singer’s “animal liberation” and Tom Regan’s “animal rights”. In this article, the term “environmental ethic” refers to an environmental ethic in a generalized sense.) All the objects deserving moral concern constitute the moral community. The trajectory and boundary of this extension are different among different schools. Compared to other schools, Tom Regan’s “animal rights” has a relatively smaller moral community, making it more “conservative” at first sight. Meanwhile, the rights view, like other schools, faces the question regarding the edge of moral concern. This question consists of two sub-questions: (1) where is the boundary of the moral community and (2) how ought we to treat the objects of moral concern near the boundary? Given the closeness of Regan’s theory to traditional ethics (regarding the boundary of the moral community), this study is mainly focused on analyzing the edge of moral concern within the framework of the theory of animal rights. Further, I investigate the similarities and differences in the boundary of moral concern among various schools of environmental ethics. The comparative analysis demonstrates a subtle relation between science and moral philosophy, and reveals a similar form of a metaphysical premise adopted by all environmental ethics. This research helps to clarify the moral concern of environmental ethics, which is an essential prerequisite for establishing a new ethic, and therefore helps to consolidate the reference of environmental ethics to environmental management.

TheoriaVolume 57, Issue 1-2 p. 111-114 Applied ethics in a hostile environment PETER SINGER, PETER SINGER Monash UniversitySearch for more papers by this author PETER SINGER, PETER SINGER Monash UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: April 1991 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1991.tb00543.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume57, Issue1-2April 1991Pages 111-114 RelatedInformation

The literature of environmental philosophy and environmental ethics has a long history. The earliest recorded Western philosophy-the Milesian school-concerned the proper understanding of the natural nonhuman world. Although individualistic ethics did not become explicit until the work of the Sophists and Socrates, virtually all preSocratic philosophers examined the role of humanity in the cosmos, the natural order of the universe. It is no exaggeration to trace the origin of environmental philosophy to the very sources of Western philosophy itself. Nonetheless, it is the recent focus on ecological and environmental problems-the awareness of the ecological crisis in all its manifestations by the intellectual community, government policymakers, leaders of industry, and the general public-that has served as an impetus for a specialized literature in environmental philosophy and ethics. This new literature transcends the content and subject matterof traditional philosophies of nature, i.e., the metaphysics of natureand humanity. Environmental philosophy examines, analyzes, and (in part) justifies direct ethical principles regarding human action

Philosophers and ethicists have long neglected moral questions that arise from our interaction with non-human animals. Most assumed that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals, and that it is therefore morally permissible to use non-human animals as a source of food, clothing, and entertainment, and for scientific purposes. In recent decades, however, that assumption has been challenged, and the moral status of non-human animals is now the subject of a lively and controversial academic debate.Advances in sciences, particularly the advent of evolutionary theory, made us realize that human beings and other animals are more similar than different, and force us to rethink our place in nature. We are no longer justified in thinking of ourselves as the crown of creation. We now understand that we are just one species among others, and we must ask ourselves anew – with an open and critical mind and without bias – which values and principles should guide our interaction with non-human animals, and how we should weigh our interests against those of other animals.Recognizing this important trend in moral thinking, the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics invited me to edit a special issue on animal ethics. The interest was so great that one issue became two, of which this is the first. I am grateful to Professor Shamima Parvin Lasker and Ms. Tahera Ahmed for giving me the opportunity to serve as a guest editor, and for their assistance during the editing process. I also thank our contributors for choosing this journal to publish their excellent work, and the reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.This, the first special issue on animal ethics contains the following five articles:Robin Attfield and Rebekah Humphreys (“Justice and Non-Human Animals”) challenge the widely held belief that non-human animals are not included within the scope of the principles of justice, and suggest that the interests of non-human animals sometimes take precedence over the interests of human beings. The implications of their argument for our interaction with other animals are profound: E.g., it is a matter of justice and fairness to prevent avoidable and unnecessary animal suffering, rather than a mere matter of compassion.Eric X. Qi (“Special Relations, Special Obligations, and Speciesism”) develops an account of the moral significance of special relations, and uses it to argue for a modest form of speciesism that steers a middle ground between anti-speciesism and crude speciesism. Unlike anti-speciesists, he maintains that species co-membership grounds special moral obligations among the members of the same species. In contrast to crude speciesists, however, he holds that our special obligations to fellow human beings do not warrant that we always attach more weight to their interests than to the comparable interests of non-human animals.Yamikani Ndasaukaand Grivas M. Kayange (“Existence and Needs: A case for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals”) argue that the existentialist view that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals rests on a weak foundation. They consider a number of arguments that have been made in support of this view and conclude that none of them holds up to critical scrutiny. They then suggest that human beings and other animals in fact deserve equal moral consideration, and – drawing from Martin Heidegger and Abraham Maslow – ground that claim in two important commonalities between them.Sreetama Chakraborty (“Animal Ethics: Beyond Neutrality, Universality, and Consistency”) explains how the postmodern approach to animal ethics departs from the traditional approach, particularly its emphasis on the principles of neutrality, universality, and consistency, and draws attention to the pernicious hierarchy of domination that separates human beings from other animals. Building on the insights of postmodernism, she takes first steps towards a new, non-anthropocentric paradigm, in the hope to achieve a sustainable balance between human interests and the interests of non-human animals.Gabriel Vidal Quiñones (“Singerian Vegetarianism and the Limits of Utilitarianism: A path towards a Meaning Ethics”) takes a critical look at Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument for vegetarianism, and argues that the conceptual resources of utilitarianism only allow for an incomplete moral understanding of our relationship with other animals. What is lacking, he suggests, is an ethical vision. He argues that, without an ethical vision, human action threatens to degenerate into mere automatism without meaning. He proposes a “meaning ethics” that he thinks is better equipped to help us decide how we ought to treat other animals.I hope you, dear reader, will enjoy reading through this remarkable collection of articles as much as I enjoyed putting it together. Maybe you will even be inspired to do some thinking of your own about issues of animal ethics and put your thoughts down on paper. If so, I sincerely hope that you will choose the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics to publish your article.Warm regards and best wishes for the new year,

The International Scientific Conference in the “Humanistic Ecology” series, entitled Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Ethics in the Face of the Ecological Crisis, was held in Warsaw on 18–20 August 2025. Co-organized by Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae (SEeB), it brought together scholars representing a range of disciplines, including environmental philosophy, ethics, theology, education, law, and the social sciences. Over three days, participants presented a broad spectrum of research and analyses addressing the contemporary ecological crisis, the human–nature relationship, sustainable development, and the ethical consequences of ongoing environmental change. In addition to plenary sessions, the programme included parallel thematic sessions that enabled in-depth discussion of climate change, biodiversity, environmental responsibility, and the axiological foundations of responses to ecological challenges. The conference also strengthened international academic cooperation within the “Humanistic Ecology” network. An important outcome was the support of publication pathways in SEeB: selected papers have already been published or made available as Online First articles, while further texts remain under editorial development.

Holmes Rolston, III examined the significance of Asian thought for Western evaluations of nature and questioned if Asian Romanticism can inform the realistic decision making required for practice. However, Rolston’s general evaluation of Asian thought ignored Confucianism. This study launches a dialogue between Rolston and contemporary Confucianism on environmental philosophy and highlights the following points in response to Rolston: First, Confucianism is grounded on an “anthropocosmic” worldview and bases its environmental ethics on its affirmation of the “virtue of life and growth” and the related vision of “unity of heaven and human beings”; it is thus an objective environmental virtue ethics with the characteristics of sacred humanism that avoids anthropocentrism. Second, Confucian ethics is built on the premise of “one principle with various manifestations” and advocates for practicing benevolence through “love with gradations”, which avoids an excessively idealistic ecocentrism. Furthermore, Confucianism may adopt Rolston’s recommendation for Asian thought concerning the incorporation of evolutionary biology into Asian traditions to facilitate their own transformation and thus contribute to environmental philosophy. Upon an exploration of the compatibility and possible reciprocal illumination between Confucianism and Rolston, this paper points out the implications of the above dialogue for theology in the planetary climate crisis.

Holmes Rolston has long been regarded as a leading figure both in environmental philosophy and in science and religion. In this chapter, though, I argue that Rolston’s work also paves the way towards rethinking animal ethics. Given the well-known hostility between many forms of environmental philosophy and animal ethics, to turn to Rolston—a notorious champion of the former field—in order to advance work in the latter field, may seem singularly perverse. But, I will maintain, Rolston’s arguments— whilst undeveloped and in some respects problematic—provide a better basis for advancing work in animal ethics than the advocacy or rejection of utilitarian or rights positions that have dominated animal ethics for several decades. In particular, I will suggest, Rolston’s work provides tools for thinking through the complicated location of domesticated animals both conceptually and ethically. So, at the end of the chapter, I make some initial moves in outlining how Rolston’s position might be developed to contribute to new thinking with respect to animals and ethics. In focusing on the place of animals in Rolston’s environmental ethics, I will touch only obliquely on the area of his work that has caused most controversy: his endorsement of a theory of objective intrinsic value in nature. That topic has been exhaustively discussed elsewhere, and I will not revisit that discussion here. The place of animals in Rolston’s work is not, though, entirely virgin territory either. Some attention has been paid to it before (notably by Peter Wenz [1989], to which Rolston responded, and later by Ned Hettinger [1994] and Moriarty and Woods [1997]). But my interest takes a somewhat different trajectory to that of existing debates, concentrating on Rolston’s understanding of nature and culture as part of the architecture of a context-oriented approach to animal ethics. In order to develop this argument, I will begin by outlining—in a very basic way—what seem to be some central problems in what we might call “philosophical animal liberation” approaches to animal ethics. Then I will move on to draw out key aspects of Rolston’s understanding of “nature” and “culture”. I will consider how animals are located within these categories, and then make some suggestions as to how Rolston’s position might contribute to a more contextual approach to animal ethics. Two further initial comments should be made for clarification. First, in using the term “animals”, I intend to confine my discussion to non-human mammals and birds. Second, I will be assuming—as does Rolston—that, on grounds of sentience at least, it makes sense to talk about these animals as being morally considerable (no stronger claim, such as that animals have rights, is intended). I will not be putting forward arguments to defend the moral considerability of these animals here.