Abstract
In 'Victor's Error' Dummett (2001) considers the semantic anti-realist's conception of truth as knowability. He ponders Fitch's paradox of knowability,1 which threatens any such conception. Dummett maintains that the anti-realist's error is to offer a blanket characterization of truth, expressed by the following knowability principle: any statement A is true if and only if it is possible to know A. Formally,
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