Abstract
Cloud computing provides people with fast services, web service companies that need computing resources often submit some of their incoming jobs to the cloud and the rest to their in-house subsystem to seek services. This forms a hybrid service system with cloud service and an in-house server. Taking into account customers' strategic behavior, this article studies the optimal decision making problems in the hybrid service system. A queue-length-based admission control mechanism is adopted in this article to regulate whether the cloud server is open to customers. When the cloud server cannot be accessed immediately, some customers send their jobs to the in-house subsystem, while others (called opportunists) try to send their jobs to the cloud server again. We derive the conditional equilibrium joining probability of entering the in-house subsystem when the cloud is not open. Based on the cooperative and noncooperative game-theoretic analyses, we determine the cooperatively optimal retrial rate and the noncooperatively optimal retrial rate for a given queue-length information. Numerical experiments show that the two optimal retrial rates are equivalent. Finally, it is found that the existence of the opportunists significantly harms social interests, regardless of whether these opportunists are cooperative or noncooperative.
Published Version
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