Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology

Matt Jope

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02153-5

Abstract

Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument for the claim that there can be no rational basis to believe our anti-sceptical hinge commitments relies upon an implicit assumption about rational support that I label The Pritchensteinian Rational Grounds Principle. I argue that, insofar as this principle is intended to apply to closure-style inferences, it leads to irrational doxastic attitudes. I consider a seemingly plausible modification of the principle that would avoid this result but show that this modified principle faces serious problems of its own.

Highlights

Duncan Pritchard’s response to closure-based scepticism draws inspiration from Wittgenstein’s remarks on scepticism, the central notion of which is that of a hinge commitment or hinge proposition
We have seen that Pritchard’s solution to the closure-based sceptical paradox is to adopt what he calls a Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation
I have focused on one rather radical aspect of this view: that optimal certainty of our anti-sceptical hinge commitments precludes a rational basis for belief in them

Summary

Introduction

Duncan Pritchard’s response to closure-based scepticism draws inspiration from Wittgenstein’s remarks on scepticism, the central notion of which is that of a hinge commitment or hinge proposition. A variety of competing accounts of hinge epistemology exist in the literature, distinguished from each other by their responses to several issues such as whether hinges are propositional, knowable, dubitable, empirical, fact-stating, justifiable and rational.. A variety of competing accounts of hinge epistemology exist in the literature, distinguished from each other by their responses to several issues such as whether hinges are propositional, knowable, dubitable, empirical, fact-stating, justifiable and rational.1 Pritchard labels his view a non-belief account of hinges, a key feature of which is the surprising claim that hinges are commitments that we cannot believe despite our being certain of them

Pritchard on closure‐based scepticism and non‐belief hinge epistemology

Against Pritchensteinian rational grounding

An alternative Pritchensteinian principle?

Conclusion