Abstract

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be.

Highlights

  • I will argue that the Wittgensteinian account provides adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement on so-called non-epistemic accounts of hinge commitments

  • I will argue that the proponent of the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement who accepts the nonepistemic theory of hinge commitments is committed to pessimism in all three senses: that they are epistemically rationally irresolvable, and neither subject to epistemically rational responses nor rational persuasion

  • We considered the non-epistemicism argument for this premise: that because hinge commitments aren’t in the market for rational belief or doubt, they aren’t in the market for rational disagreement and rationally resolving such disagreements is impossible

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Summary

Introduction

Consider disagreements over whether the Earth was created by God less than 10,000 years ago (so-called young Earth creationism), or over the worldview expressed. I will argue that the Wittgensteinian account provides adequate support for pessimism about deep disagreement on so-called non-epistemic accounts of hinge commitments On this view, hinge commitments aren’t subject to rational evaluation and otherwise lack epistemic properties (Pritchard 2011a, 2016). I will argue that the proponent of the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement who accepts the nonepistemic theory of hinge commitments is committed to pessimism in all three senses: that they are epistemically rationally irresolvable, and neither subject to epistemically rational responses nor rational persuasion. In the remaining parts of the paper, I explore how the different ways of developing the theory of hinge commitments can have a serious impact on whether the Wittgensteinian account adequately supports pessimism I am indebted here to an anonymous referee for their very helpful suggestions on the different senses of rational resolution in play

Hinge commitments and pessimism
Non-propositionalism
The non-belief theory
Entitlement theory
Hinges as authenticity-conditions of cognitive projects
Entitlement to trust and disagreement
Non-belief theory
Conclusion
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