Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the relationship between political corruption and land market outcomes. Three rounds of parliamentary elections in Ukraine are analyzed from 2002 to 2010. Evidence of rental rates for land being higher in districts that exhibit greater electoral support for parties that form the parliamentary opposition after the elections is found. On the other hand, average rental rates are lower in pro-majority districts that give evidence of clientelistic relations being formed in certain regions of Ukraine as well as state capture in the land market.
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