Civil-Military Relations and the Construction of Consolidated Democracy: The Case of Bulgaria

Abstract

The past ten years have been witness to a remarkable set of achievements in Bulgaria: the basic goals of post-totalitarian transition in civil-military relations have been broadly attained; a parliamentary democratic regime is functioning steadily; civil society is being structured on an institutional level; the principles of a market economy are establishing themselves; the process of change of ownership has almost been completed; the foundations of civil control over the military have been laid; and the armed forces are politically neutral, obeying solely the legitimately elected political institutions and the laws which result from that process. However, much work remains to be done. Consolidating the process of democratization poses many questions. What paradigm of civil-military relations will prove sustainable for Bulgaria? Which form of control over the armed forces would be most appropriate for the development of society within the newly constituted state? And what are the problems caused by the details of societal transformation? In this paper, we argue that, with large changes taking place within the functioning of the state, it is necessary to purposefully introduce norms and practices of the model of shared responsibility into the overall context of civil-military relations. After 1989, the military and civil spheres found themselves in the unique situation of taking part in the total transformation of Bulgarian society. All three parties to civil-military relations (the political elite, the military professionals, and the citizens) have been adopting new cultural models of behavior and relations. Political institutions, ideas about their ideal functions, and visions of the relations among them—all have been changing. The role, organizational structure, competencies, political leadership, and means of control over the armed forces are in transition. The essential relations between the citizens and the state have been altered.1 None of this has been easy. The complexity of the situation is emphasized by the comparative lack of any practical or theoretical models of such largescale transformations. The aim, obviously, is to fully replace totalitarian political control of the military by the party/state with sustainable principles and mechanisms that lead to democratic and objective controls over the armed forces, after the classical scheme suggested by Samuel Huntington. The desired result is primacy on the part of the civil and political spheres over the previously and largely