China's role in the chemical and biological disarmament regimes

Abstract

Modern China has been linked with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and missile weapons technology to states of proliferation concern, and its compliance with arms control and disarmament is seen as key to the effectiveness of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation efforts. In this context, the answer to Gerald Segal’s question, “Does China really matter?” is most definitely, “Yes.” In the realm of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), Beijing’s role is closely linked to its view of the multilateral disarmament regimes for CBW, namely the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and of related multilateral export control efforts. These views, in turn, depend on how CBW figure in China’s tactical and strategic posture, which includes a declared nuclear weapons (NW) capability and a strategic missile force. Where CBW proliferation is concerned, the key question today is not whether China matters, but whether the Chinese government is serious about eliminating both chemical and biological weapons—it maintains it never developed the latter—and preventing the proliferation of CBW-related technology. China has been an active participant (at least in the last two decades) in both chemical and biological disarmament and arms control negotiations. Outwardly at least—and with considerable diplomatic effort—China broadcasts its commitment to both the CWC and the BWC.