China’s Global Maritime Access: Alternatives to Overseas Military Bases in the Twenty-First Century

Abstract

China lacks the network of foreign military bases that typically attends great-power expansion, yet its armed forces operate at an increasingly global scale. How has the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) managed this feat without a significant footprint on foreign soil? Why has Chinese leadership not (yet) established a network of bases to address security threats to China’s overseas interests? This article analyzes the structural constraints facing China’s military basing abroad and then examines the methods by which the PLA has nonetheless achieved significant global power-projection capability. It highlights the capacity provided by international maritime transport infrastructure owned and operated by Chinese firms as a viable—yet limited—means of securing national interests overseas with military power. The study demonstrates that the structural setting and historical sequence of China’s rise render foreign military bases relatively costly, incentivizing alternative modes of access and power projection in the maritime domain.