China's Cautious Relations with North Korea and Indochina

Abstract

4,200 Chinese troops in Cambodia, headlined one Hong Kong newspaper in mid May 1970 (citing Taiwan sources) after the American incursion into Cambodia.' Soon to follow were different types of reports from Moscow and Phnom Penh. The Russians were dropping hints that China already had quietly assured the U.S. that it would not intervene with troops.2 And the new Phnom Penh government claimed that China had recognized the Sihanouk regime only after Cambodian Premier Lon Nol had refused to make an accommodation with Peking.3 Undoubtedly, the spectre of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops pouring into Indochina has haunted some western observers.4 What are the prospects of this happening? If China's foreign policy of the past twenty years is a reliable guide, then there indeed may be some accuracy in the Moscow and Phnom Penh charges. It has become a cliche to speak of a 'cautious, low-cost low-risk' Chinese foreign policy. The restrained manner of her entrance into the Korean War and the limited nature of the 1962 Indian border clash are usually cited as examples of Chinese bellicose rhetoric not matching practice. This generally accepted wisdom seems to be borne out by her recent relations with the two border areas which have the most potential for provoking a Sino-American confrontation-Korea and Indochina.