China as a Factor in the World Food Situation

Abstract

To see China as a factor in the world food situation it is necessary to examine worldwide trends first. Ever since Malthus's dismal prediction, alarmists have periodically foretold approaching disaster, only to be followed by alternating waves of optimism accompanied by surges in food production. Globally, the historical trends have been reassuring about man's ability to keep food output growth ahead of population growth. The race has been won despite the fact that since the end of the eighteenth century the world has witnessed an unprecedented population explosion, with mankind multiplying himself by about four and a half times. The burgeoning numbers have been attributable mainly to exogenous improvement in medicine and health measures rather than to the workings of the forces responsible for the so-called in economic development. The future appears more reassuring in this regard as the developing nations appear finally to have entered the transition phase and begun to show noticeable declines in fertility (Wortman and Cummings, p. 29). Falling fertility rates are expected to continue among the developing nations, with total world population reaching perhaps 6 billion by the year 2000 instead of the much higher earlier forecasts, possibly stabilizing itself as early as 2020. This hardly suggests, however, that the increase in the number of mouths to be fed will not be substantial in the period ahead. World population will have risen by more than 70 million in 1981 alone, and by the year 2000 the annual increase may be half again as large as at present. What are the prospects for food production, in particular grain output? The historical record and thoughtful assessment of the key factors at work probably warrant cautious optimism. World grain output has kept ahead of multiplying numbers. Per capita consumption has risen strongly in the high income countries and at least marginally in the less developed world. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) world'crop production statistics puts total world grain output (wheat, coarse grains, milled rice) at an annual average of 851 million tons in the early 1960s. By 1980/81, roughly two decades later, it has reached 1.44 billion tons, a rise of nearly 70%, or an average rate of nearly 3% a year. The average leaves a margin of 1% a year as per capita improvement. These averages mask the fact that in the 1970s aggregate performance showed some weakening. The commodity crunch of 197274, coming on top of unusually strong global economic growth, decimated the U.S. food stockpiles and its set-aside acreages. The margins have been built up, however. According to USDA estimates, the world entered the 1980s with about the same stocks-to-consumption ratio in grains as a decade ago, about 16%, or a 60-day supply. Concern centers on the uncertain Soviet grain output and the distribution of cost and responsibility of the world's reserves. U.S. government agencies (USDA and CIA) tend to project an extension of past margins with output overshadowing population in growth, while stressing the technical possibilities for the predicted outcome. Despite lack of consensus, it is probably prudent to share Barnett's considered judgment for the balance of the century that the outlook does not justify apocalyptic predictions of disaster (p. 279). There are several points on which there is general awareness and some agreement. (a) Though technically plausible, the worth of the relatively sanguine forecasts hinges on responsible and effective government policies in economic and demographic domains. It is well to note, however, some new technological directions of possibly great future import. The new plant and animal genetics opens up a Anthony M. Tang is professor of economics at Vanderbilt University. The author expresses his appreciation for research support from the Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei, Taiwan where he visited during the summer of 1981.