Children’s Rights and Their Limitations

Abstract

In her seminal paper Onora O’Neill (1988) examined the legal and moral principles behind children’s rights. She argued that children should be protected and nurtured because of their special vulnerabilities and thus should not and could not have full rights of citizenship. Huntington (2006) continues this view, arguing that children’s welfare, or their protection, is not best achieved through the promotion of their rights, as children are not able to understand them, lacking the cognitive capacity or emotional maturity to make decisions. For Huntington, issues of poverty are more pertinent than rights in understanding an issue such as child abuse, and thus attention to poverty should receive greater priority. The argument offered here is a familiar one: children do not have full autonomy, and therefore rights as a mechanism for promotion of their welfare or access to citizenship are ineffective and inappropriate. However, as this chapter will argue, this is based on a misunderstanding of the nature and form of rights today. While the recognition of poverty and the vulnerability of many children is welcome, this is not the condition of all children, and fails to recognise children’s own agency and the complex and interdependent manner in which human rights, including children’s rights, have developed. This chapter explores the development of human rights and some of the ways in which children’s rights fit, or jar against, general human rights. It explores the tensions in the relationships between children, parents and families, and the state in the operationalising of human rights. It also discusses the limitations and constraints of human rights for children’s citizenship and identifies broader issues of power, rather than the technical identification, deployment and enforcement of rights, as defining children’s citizenship.