Abstract

Na esteira dos recentes e importantes eventos de flagrantes violações da privacidade, é proposto um repensar da justificativa do direito à privacidade, pois tais violações levantam questões de responsabilidade democrática e, ao menos potencialmente, contribuem para corroer a legitimidade das atuais organizações de governança locais e internacionais. Neste artigo, discutir-se-á primeiramente o caso da violação da privacidade de um jovem autista intimidado (bullied) e o consequente julgamento de três executivos do Google. Depois, serão analisados os argumentos dos especialistas, acadêmicos ou não, que concordam com a afirmação do Google de que, se a primeira sentença não tivesse sido contestada, as comportas para várias outras jurisdições teriam sido abertas e, como consequência, serviriam como pretexto para aumentar o controle na internet, comprometendo a liberdade de expressão enquanto direito inalienável que não deveria ser censurado. Por fim, além das sentenças e dos seus contextos imediatos, propõe-se uma justificativa teórica da análise exposta. O principal argumento consiste no valor do direito à privacidade estar baseado na leitura de que sua violação prejudicaria a capacidade dos cidadãos de participar efetivamente da política democrática.

Highlights

  • In view of perceived regulation shortcomings, self-regulation as an alternative to Regulated Self-Governance (Andresani and Ferlie 2006; see Knill and Tosun 2012) has been seen as a response both more effective and flexible

  • The recent Vividown case will be examined in order to assess if self-regulation and ‘light’ (Network) Governance is and should always be the right regulatory approach (Andresani and Ferlie 2006, Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani 2012)

  • Internet is a tool, but it is able to act as a sort of ‘multiplier’ by expanding and stimulating new and old types of behaviour thanks to specific psychological mechanisms (‘crowd effects, ‘distance’ etc)

Read more

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In view of perceived regulation shortcomings, self-regulation as an alternative to Regulated Self-Governance (Andresani and Ferlie 2006; see Knill and Tosun 2012) has been seen as a response both more effective and flexible. Modern communications networks, including Internet, seem to use the GIANLUCA ANDRESANI NATALINA STAMILE same expressions and the same type of ‘hate speech’. In this perspective, technologies assume, in general, the aspects of ‘mere tool’ to spread already entrenched biases and prejudices (such as homophobic and racist speech). Networks facilitate the manifestation of hate speech In this latter case, Internet is a tool, but it is able to act as a sort of ‘multiplier’ by expanding and stimulating new and old types of behaviour thanks to specific psychological mechanisms (‘crowd effects, ‘distance’ etc). We will use both arguments and narratives (Andresani and Ward forthcoming) to show that the case has wider implications for comparative institutional analysis (cf. Doh and Guay, 2006; Matten and Moon, 2004), and for legal and philosophical reflections

BACKGROUND
SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
THE SPECIFICITY OF THE INTERNET
DIGNITY VS LIBERTY
17 See for a powerful rebuttal of the argument
A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH?
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call