Cheating ‘Jack Tar’: seafarers’ wages in Britain’s Royal Navy, 1754–1767

Abstract

ABSTRACT The introduction of the Navy Act of 1758 by the British Parliament was designed to provide a mechanism whereby the payment of wages and allowances to Royal Navy seafarers and their dependants would be placed on a more equitable footing through more timely remittances. This study challenges earlier claims made concerning the effectiveness of the Act in this regard. By utilising modern accrual accounting techniques, we demonstrate conclusively how, over a 14-year period of war and peace (1754–1767) that included the promulgation of the Act, seafarers were forced to endure longer periods for payment seemingly at odds with the desires of Parliament. We provide explanations regarding this phenomenon showing seafarers were ensnared in a macro-level public-finance policy agenda that strictly prioritised the credit status of the Royal Navy through the timely payment of Navy bills at the expense of the day-to-day survival needs of seafarers. In order to maintain reputation and ensure the ongoing supply of materials, we show that accounting technologies, in the form of parliamentary budgetary processes and Treasury and Royal Navy cash management practices, were used to deliver this outcome.