Characteristics Of Diligent Audit Committees

Abstract

The mounting attention given to audit committees following a series of corporate financial reporting failures has resulted in numerous provisions within Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX hereafter) of 2002. The SOX addresses aspects of the audit committee, including its authority and composition characteristics, but the requirement for minimum meeting frequency for the audit committee member was absent from the final SOX provision despite the recommendations of regulators. Since audit committee activity, or degree of audit committee diligence, is determined by the audit committee itself, we investigate various firm-level and governance attributes that likely influence audit committees choice to meet more often than anticipated. After analyzing a sample of 2,715 firm-year observations spanning fiscal years 1998-2003, we find that audit committee diligence is positively associated with audit committee attributes such as financial expertise, but negatively association with audit committee tenure, suggesting that efficiency gains are enjoyed by audit committees as they become more familiar with firm-specific reporting issues. We also document positive associations between audit committee diligence and both governance and agency cost variables. Finally, we document a significant increase in audit committee diligence in the years following the implementation of the SOX 2002 provisions.