Abstract
According to the epistemic conception of delusions, delusional thought can be distinguished from nondelusional thought by the degree to which it involves departures from the norms of epistemic rationality. This conception is enshrouded in the DSM characterization of delusions and is presupposed by most theoretical accounts of delusions. This paper presents a number of objections to the epistemic conception, and argues that the view is less plausible than an alternative approach that centres on the notion of proper function. According to the proper function view, delusions occur when the systems responsible for belief-fixation fail to function in the way that they were designed to function. Thus understood, delusions can involve departures from the norms of epistemic rationality but they need not.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
