Abstract
This chapter illustrates a categorization of real-world problem structures using different prototypical games as well as an analysis of basic mechanisms that allow agents to realize improved results in social dilemma situations. The basic problem structures range from social optimum games to dilemma games, with a number of different coordination and anti-coordination games in between. Mechanisms for improving agents’ results include approaches based on formal, game-theoretic formulations as well as real-world considerations focusing on emerging institutions. The game-theoretic formulations allow identifying basic mechanisms that may change the problem structure that agents face, thereby enabling the realization of improved results. Real-world agents need further support for a structured improvement of the outcomes of their actions. This support is lend to them by social institutions in case of dilemmas, and less demanding social rules, stabilizing expectations regarding others’ behavior, in the case of coordination problems.
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