Abstract
Certificates of deposit (CDs) are uninsured deposits that have not been protected by the Japan Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) since the beginning of the issuance in May 1979. Thus, CDs should reflect exceedingly well banks’ failure probabilities and the risk perception of market participants among many types of depositors in Japan. Because of this, CDs issued by Japanese banks may enhance the market discipline of banking organizations. This is the first chapter to test the depositor discipline hypothesis using Japanese bank data from the financial year 1998 to the financial year 2003 . The chapter develops reduced-form models that describe how interest rates and the quantity of CDs may be related to banks’ financial measures. Among the Japanese CAMEL ratings, the chapter finds that CD interest rates are sensitive to the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and that CD quantities are sensitive to ROA. The chapter also insists that CD holders in Japan are sensitive to bank risks and exercise disciplinary power to impose market discipline that compliments regulatory discipline.
Published Version
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