Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of how best to think about the brain–mind from both philosophical and psychiatric perspectives. The section on philosophy of mind notes the positions of physicalism, dualism, and functionalism, and proposes that emergent materialism has particular advantages. The section on psychiatry notes the positions of behaviourism and existentialism. Two key metaphors of the brain–mind are then critiqued: the hydraulic model of psychoanalysis, and the computational model of cognitive science. A third metaphor, that of ‘wetware’, which emphasizes that the brain–mind cannot simply be divided into hardware and software, but rather that it must be approached as a complex psychobiological phenomenon, is proposed. Several advantages of this metaphor are discussed, including that it is consistent with emergent materialism and a view of the brain–mind as embodied and embedded in social activity, as well as with current cognitive-affective and psychiatric science.
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