Chapter 2 - An Efficient Provably Secure Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme for Intervehicular Ad Hoc Networks

Abstract

Intervehicular ad hoc networks are designed to facilitate direct communications among vehicles to ensure safer roads, reduce traffic congestion, and enhance travel comfort. Automotive vehicular information such as vehicle coordinates, speed, traffic status, weather conditions, and road defects can be crucial for other vehicles and traffic control centers, for making critical decisions and dispensing the right services in emergency situations. Hence, secure authenticated channels must be established among the communicating vehicular nodes, to protect vital information that often includes sensitive data concerning the driver’s privacy. Authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is an ideal cryptographic tool to negotiate a shared secret key among two authentic entities, in a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). In this regard, we cryptanalyze the existing identity-based authenticated key agreement (ID-AKA) scheme designed for securing VANETs and prove that the protocol is vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attacks. Several flaws in the security proof were also identified. Furthermore, we propose a provably secure efficient ID-AKA protocol for securing VANETs based on the gap Diffie–Hellman assumption. A comparative analysis of the proposed protocol with the existing ID-AKA schemes shows that the protocol attains higher security guarantees at lower computational cost.