Chapter 11 - Kant on Constructing Causal Representations

Abstract

This chapter presents a Kantian critique of Patricia Cheng's definition of “cause,” and her solution to the puzzle of causal priority. Covariation accounts are widely understood to be vulnerable to the problem of “common causes.” Although Cheng finds inspiration in Hume and Kant, both philosophers would reject the Power PC theory, and for exactly the same reason. They did not believe that the notion of a “power” was sufficiently clear or precise to be usable in science or philosophy. The broad outlines of Hume's critique are familiar. Cheng does not regard the “power” aspect of the Power PC theory as having Humean sanction. Rather, she traces “causal powers” back to Kant. Some commentators suggest that Kant retained an Aristotelian notion of causal efficacy along with a modified Humean regularity theory. However, they see the two types of causality as playing different roles in his system. On this view, Kant needed Aristotelian power causality not for the purpose of rebutting Hume in the Second Analogy.