Channel structures and information value in a closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility based on the third-party collection

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• The closed-loop supply chain models with corporate social responsibility are conducted. • The equilibrium decisions under symmetric and asymmetric information are derived. • Channel power is not always beneficial to the leader. • The value of information depends on the level of corporate social responsibility. In this paper, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer with corporate social responsibility (CSR), a retailer with sales effort, and a third party who is responsible for collecting used products. Different Stackelberg game models are constructed for three channel power structures under information symmetry and information asymmetry, respectively. Under information symmetry, we analyze the impacts of the channel power structure on the channel participants’ profits. We find that whether the channel power is beneficial to the game leader, or the followers depends on the level of the manufacturer's CSR. Furthermore, our results show that no matter which participant becomes the channel leader, her profit will increase as the level of CSR increases. Under information asymmetry, the value of information to the supply chain participants is investigated. We find that if the manufacturer is the channel leader, the value of information to her depends on the information's half range. However, for the retailer-led and third-party-led structures, the symmetric information is always beneficial to the channel leaders, so that they are always motivated to share their private information.