Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain where the supplier can distribute products through an online platform and a capital-constrained traditional offline retailer. The retailer needs to fund its business by a portfolio financing of trade credit and platform investment to enter the market. With the price-dependent market uncertain demand, the supplier faces choices among direct, traditional, and dual channels for product distribution. We use the CVaR criterion to formulate the retailer’s risk-averse behaviour. Then derive the optimal retail channel strategy in a Stackelberg game model where the platform leads by setting a revenue-sharing rate. Our results unveil a Pareto improvement region in revenue sharing rates within the portfolio financing scheme. As the slotting fee escalates, the supplier tends towards traditional channels. Conversely, with a modest slotting fee, a threshold emerges for the retailer’s risk aversion, delineating the optimal retail channel. High retailer risk aversion favours the dual channel, while lower aversion steers all members towards the direct channel. Theoretical findings are validated through numerical analysis.

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