Abstract
This article showcases the understudied institutional Army, the generating force, as a critical prerequisite for overall strategic success. Competition, crisis, and conflict require more than the manned, trained, and equipped units that deploy. This article analyzes six case studies of institutional Army reforms over 160 years to examine adaptation in peace and war. The conclusions provide historical insights to inform current practices and fulfill the Army’s articulated 2022 Institutional Strategy.
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