Centralized or Decentralized Transfer Prices: A Behavioral Approach for Improving Supply Chain Coordination

Abstract

Problem definition: We study supply chain coordination in a setting with transshipment. We use centralized and decentralized transfer prices as a way to increase supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: The ability to transship can improve channel efficiency by improving the match between supply and demand. We study how human decision makers behave in this setting and provide clear insights to improve coordination. Methodology: We use controlled laboratory experiments with financially incentivized human subjects. We study a broad set of critical ratios under both decentralized and centralized transfer-price settings. In the decentralized transfer-price setting, retailers negotiate a transfer price. In the centralized transfer-price setting, we use two different approaches: theoretical and behavioral transfer price. Both approaches suggest opposite recommendations. Results: Analytically, the optimal transfer price should depend on the critical ratio; but results from the decentralized setting show that participants set prices as if they ignore the critical ratio and instead focus on splitting potential profit from transshipped units in half. However, there is a positive relationship between transfer prices and ordering decisions. Moreover, generalizing the pull-to-center effect, we find that subjects do not place orders that coordinate the supply chain. For the centralized setting, we find that using the theoretical approach does not coordinate ordering decisions and does not improve decisions compared with the decentralized setting. The behavioral approach suggests a transfer price close to product selling price for a high critical ratio and a transfer price below product cost for a low critical ratio. These recommendations lead to coordinating ordering decisions. Managerial implications: We draw two practical conclusions from our research. First, transshipments are unambiguously beneficial, resulting in higher profitability, and, when feasible, should be encouraged. Second, when possible, transfer prices should be set centrally but taking into account subjects’ behavior. Otherwise, price negotiation might lead to better performance.