Abstract
In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As a result, it was found that the spillover effect will reduce the level of social welfare. At the same time, the intervention of the central government and the adoption of policies tailored to local conditions will be conducive to the improvement of social welfare.
Highlights
Promoting the sustainable development of the environment through pollution intervention and emission reduction is an important environmental and economic issue
When the central government adopts a policy that is tailored to local conditions, the recycling fees set by it will be equal to the recycling fees individually set by the local government of two regions, and the subsidies are the same
Under unilateral transboundary pollution, when the central government adopts a policy of adapting to local conditions, the recycling fee set by it will be equal to the level of no unilateral transboundary pollution
Summary
Promoting the sustainable development of the environment through pollution intervention and emission reduction is an important environmental and economic issue. Before the law was revised, the established waste recycling system in China was dominated by local governments. Due to the characteristics of the Chinese administrative system, the process of system transition is an important issue where either the central or local government dominates recycling policies. Taking household electrical appliances as an example, household electrical appliances produced in Shanghai may be sold to Beijing, which may cause environmental pollution (cross-border pollution) in Beijing; for the fees paid by the waste-responsible person (product manufacturer), these enter Shanghai’s government revenue, resulting in an asymmetric responsibility for fiscal revenue and environmental protection burden. Taking the example of household appliances, local governments have the same administrative level, and due to insufficient horizontal coordination of local governments, they may generate unequal fiscal revenue or fail to implement environmental protection policies.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
