Abstract

Much recent work has debated the effect of decentralization on service provision, its underlying mechanisms, and the tradeoff between responsiveness and elite capture. This study contributes to that debate by investigating a rare partial rollout of institutional change that reversed administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization in Taiwan. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design, I find that centralization decreases public goods provision and that such a negative effect is stronger and more robust on those public goods that involve greater local government activity. Additional evidence related to mechanisms suggests that the loss of proximity and accountability in service delivery after centralization can be critical. The effect heterogeneity results do not constitute strong evidence that centralization significantly improves service provision in areas with higher levels of local elite capture. These findings highlight the importance of decentralization’s responsiveness advantages in improving local service provision and advance the policy debate on local institutional choice.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.