Abstract
In March 2003, the Bush administration resorted to preventive war as a means of creating a democratic role model for the Middle East. This break with the traditional American diplomatic approach is fraught with obstacles; whether one considers it bold or senseless, it is a dramatic break with the past. For decades, American policy has employed a diplomatic strategy to solve, or at the least contain, problems that arose in the region. When the diplomatic card failed during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Washington countered by trying to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict and control inter-Arab disagreements to prevent inroads by the Soviet Union. Two new monographs explore this process from 1945 to 1961. Peter L. Hahn's Caught in the Middle East presents a survey approach to America's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Salim Yaqub's Containing Arab Nationalism dissects the development and failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Hahn's work builds upon the author's earlier book that concentrated on the role of the United States, Great Britain, and Egypt from 1945 to 1956. The book's findings are based on voluminous research that synthesizes the relevant primary and secondary sources, particularly those in Hebrew. The author presents a convincing argument that the American approach of “dual containment” resulted in a flawed policy that by 1960 left in place a “volatile formula for a perpetual conflict perpetuated by explosive wars” (p. 277).
Published Version
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