Categories of Wrong Beliefs—A Preliminary Proposal

Abstract

Wrong beliefs, known by some as ‘alternative facts’, have recently spread widely, causing damage in important areas of human life, including social, political, and public health domains. This article is a preliminary proposal consisting of two aspects. First, an analogy to biologic stigmergic effects is drawn. The claim is that social media products are the potent drivers of wrong belief proliferation rather than iterative individual person-to-person communications. Second, the article offers an epistemological category classification of wrong beliefs, with the following mappings: a) ‘No-Information’ marked by willful blindness results in ‘Empty Beliefs’; b) ‘Mis-Information’ yields ‘Mis(taken) Beliefs’; and c) ‘Dis-Information’ predicated on blatant distortions produces ‘Dis(torted) Beliefs’. This simple classification system is not merely epistemologically satisfying; it is functionally useful, providing a foundational definitional distinction between mis-information and dis-information—terms too often used interchangeably. To distinguish them will allow (even promote) basic research to go forth—for example by statistically tracking differential tendencies of malignant/distorted dis-information vs. mistaken/mis-information spread. Moreover, this sort of research could ultimately lead the way to positive policy implications.