Abstract
This paper presents three propositions. First, the author suggests that there is a growing potential for technologically induced catastophes. Second, our capacity to analyze technological risk is inhibited in part because: (1) we tend to confuse low-probability/low-consequence events with low-probability/high-consequence risks; (2) we seldom adopt a holistic approach to the analysis of risk; and (3) we tend to underestimate the effects of catastrophic events. The author further argues that existing control systems, including federal regulatory bodies, are inadequate. In the conclusion the author discusses difficulties likely to accompany the design and creation of risk control systems.
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