Cascading failures of overload behaviors on interdependent networks

Abstract

The increasing dependence between infrastructure networks and the threat of cascading failures on network security motivated the analysis of the overload behaviors on interdependent networks. Here, considering the node load redistribution mechanism, we study the robustness of interdependent networks with different attack strategies, connection strategies and load distribution mechanisms considering attack strength (r), coupling strength (q) and different network topologies (Erdős–Rényi network model and Albert–László Barabási network model). Compared to the different connection strategies, with q and qc, we conclude that the response of the cascade failure is more evident in the assorted connections which keep more concentrated load nodes. Meanwhile, by the proportional allocation of load in interdependent networks, we observe that the BA–BA networks with DC strategy (connect nodes with high load in network A and nodes with low load in network B) have the worst robust level against cascading failures in the case of the intentional attack. In addition, by considering the charge distribution mechanisms, we demonstrate that interdependent networks have the greatest capacity to withstand risk when the charge distribution preference (β) is closed at the initial charge of the nodes (τ). Theoretical solutions are useful for revealing cascading failures of overload behaviors in large-scale networks composed of multiple networks in the real world.