Carneades’ Distinction Between Assent and Approval

Abstract

Ancient sceptics, unlike their modern counterparts, claim to live their scepticism. Nowadays scepticism, whether epistemological, moral, or of any other variety, is seen as a purely theoretical position, with no direct bearing on actual living of one's life; this is because theories and everyday attitudes are taken to be in some way insulated from one another. Serious questions may be raised about character of this alleged insulation, but these are not my present concern; fact is that no such split between the philosophical and the ordinary was entertained in ancient world.1 It follows that viability of scepticism as a way of life is a crucial issue for ancient sceptics. It is no accident that one of most enduring objections to ancient scepticism is to effect that sceptical attitude?that is, posture of universal suspension of judgement?is incompatible with any kind of normal human action; this was known in antiquity as charge of apraxia, inaction. The sceptics for their part, were just as persistent in arguing that suspension of judge ment had no such damaging consequences. In as much as assessment of actual or imaginable types of human life is province of ethics, I take this debate between ancient sceptics and their detractors to be, in a broad sense, an ethical debate.2 My focus in this paper is on Academic sceptic Carneades, and on whether he can defend himself against objection just mentioned. Unlike Pyrrhonean sceptics and unlike even his Academic predecessor Arcesilaus, Carneades does not appear to have explicitly promoted, or recommended, sceptical attitude as desirable;3 indeed, he appears to have been singularly reticent about very notion of suspension of judge ment (epoche). But whatever his reasons for this silence, he is said by his in terpreter and closest associate Clitomachus to have rid our minds of as sent;4 and suspension of judgement is, precisely, witholding of assent.5 Moreover, assent itself is described in same passage in mythical terms, as a wild and savage monster (feram et immanen beluam), needing Her culean powers to overcome, and also, more soberly, as a form of rashness {temeritatem). If we may take Clitomachus' description as