Candidate‐centred electoral systems and change in incumbent vote share: A cross‐national and longitudinal analysis

Abstract

AbstractThis study examines if prime minister's parties are punished or rewarded by voters to a lesser extent in candidate‐centred electoral systems compared to party‐centred systems. Candidate‐centred systems allow the voters greater choice in determining the fate of individual candidates at the district level and create incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote rather than pursuing a party vote. Voters in these systems are more likely to focus on individual candidates than on parties, thus fostering individual accountability at the expense of collective (party) accountability. Cross‐sectional time‐series data for 23 OECD countries between 1961 and 2014 were analysed. Two indices of intraparty efficiency (the Farrell–McAllister Index and the Shugart Index) were used to capture the candidate‐centredness of electoral systems. The analysis of aggregate‐level data with almost 300 observations showed that incumbent parties tend to win or lose fewer votes in candidate‐centred electoral systems. This effect has become stronger over time. Candidate‐centredness has a weak moderating impact on the state of the economy on the degree of public sanctioning of government parties.