Canadian Diplomacy and the Hungarian Revolution 1956-1957: A Documentary Perspective by Greg s> Donaghy (review)

Abstract

372 SEER, 84, 2, 2006 the heroic nationalfreedom struggleof I848 and promulgatingfilmson partisan warfare against the foreign oppressor led the Hungarian youth to take action in October and November I956 against the foreign oppressor they knew best: the Soviet Union. In short, Agentsof Moscowis a worthy contribution to the growing scholarshipon nationalismunder Communism.An extremelywell-researched monograph, it will surely enhance both graduate and undergraduatecourses on Soviet and East European historyand politics. UralsStateUniversi_y, Ekaterinburg JOHANNA GRANVILLE Donaghy, Greg (comp.). CanadianDiplomacyand the HungarianRevolution I956-I957: A Documentagy Perspective. Historical Section, Foreign Ministry of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 2004. vii + 8o pp. Notes. Tables. Price unknown. IN this slim documentary collection, Greg Donaghy (Historical Section, Canadian Department of ForeignA.airs and InternationalTrade, or DFAIT) has selected documents that, among other things, elucidate the impact of the Soviet intervention in 1956 on Canada's policy toward Eastern Europe, the influence of the Suez Crisis on the timing of the Soviet military decision, Canada'srelationswith India, one of the leadersof the nonalignedmovement, and the conflict among Canadian officials in providing aid and asylum to Hungarian refugees. The Soviet invasionshockedCanadian diplomatsand statesmenlike Lester Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairswho wrote on I5 November I956, 'The Hungarian revolt has been the first major proof that Soviet indoctrinationand methods of controlhave not been successful,despite ten years of Soviet effort' (p. 3I). Jules Leger (Under-Secretaryof State for ExternalAffairs)also concluded that the Russians had 'seriouslyendangered theirpolicy of co-existenceand the positionof the Communistpartiesin Western Europe, in order to keep Hungary in the Soviet bloc, and to protect their strategicposition' (p. 33). The Canadians'negative view of 'bruteforce' then shaped their subsequentpolicy toward EasternEurope. As Leger wrote, 'To my mind, the most importantthing is to bring it upon the Russians that, by theirown actions,they have shattered whatever confidence intheir intentions theworld had begun toentertain, and that they stand alone and isolatedbefore world opinion' (p. 24, emphasismine JG). Here we can see a fundamentaldifferencebetween Canadian and Russian values and world-views.Documents that have emerged from Soviet archives (the 'Malin Notes') reveal that, in fact, the Kremlin leaders were more concerned about appearingweak in the eyes of the Westernpowersif they abstained from the use of force, especiallyat a time when the British,Frenchand Israelis had resolutelyapplied militaryforce in Egypt. Nevertheless, the documents Donaghy has selected forcefullydemonstrate the Canadian diplomats' caution and willingness to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt. In the same report(citedabove)Leger continued, 'At the REVIEWS 373 same time, I thinkwe must not go so farthatwe nullifywhateverchances may remain of moderating to some extent the severity of Soviet repressionby a genuine humanitarianappeal' (p. 24). LikeAmerican employees in the Radio Free Europe organization, Canadian policymakersalso concluded that steps should be taken to ensure that Canadian broadcaststo the satellitecountries were not 'inflammatory'.It would be best to encourage 'gradualismin the evolution of EasternEurope', they thought, since the West was hampered in assistingmilitarilyany liberationmovementsthere for fear of sparkinga world war (p. 34). Canadian diplomats expressedsincere regret about the timing of the Suez Crisis, which they believed ruined any chance the West had of negotiating Soviet troop withdrawalsfrom Hungary, Romania and Poland (pp. I2, 17). They guessedcorrectlythatthe Britishand Frenchactionswere not 'the dominant factor in determining the ultimate course of Soviet action, which was determinedprimarilyby militarynecessity'.Mobilizationtakestime and has to be startedin advancewell beforethe decisionto invadeis made. Thus, the fact that Soviet militarypreparationsbegan three or four days before the Israelis' initial attackon Egypt did not necessarilymean the Kremlin intended to use the Suez Crisis as a diversion for an invasion of Hungary (p. I7). Canadian Diplomacy andtheHungarian Revolution also containsan interestingset of documents that show the Canadians' disappointment at India for loudly denouncing the Israeliattackon Egypt but remaining silent about the Soviet invasion of Hungary. As Escott Reid, Canada's High Commissioner in India wrote on I3 November I956, 'My conversationwith Nehru was [the] most depressing example of his willingness to find the least blameworthy explanation of every step the USSR has taken in respect of Hungary' (p. 27). Still other documents in Donaghy's collection indicate how earnestly Canadian officials wished to help Hungarian refugees resettle in Canada. Prime Minister St.-Laurent instructed the...