Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq

Abstract

The in Iraq overshadowed Canada-U.S. relations during Chretien-Bush years. Prime Minister Jean Chretien's refusal to support U.S.-led invasion to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power without backing of United Nations enjoyed solid parliamentary and public support. But conservative commentators, politicians, and business community criticized government for substituting process for policy, letting down its closest ally, and risking American retaliation. Bush administration officials expressed disappointment and hinted at possible damage to relationship. (1) This essay examines rift between Chretien and Bush governments over Iraq. It argues that Chretien's decision to stand aside reflected a deep skepticism about President George Bush's case for war. (2) As Canadian government saw it, U.S. administration's contention that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was uncertain at best. Ottawa's calls for a vigorous UN inspection program and Security Council sanction were aimed at subjecting claim to international scrutiny and decision. Chretien judged correctly that close intertwining of Canadian and U.S. economies made substantive retaliation unlikely. However, anti-Bush rhetoric from members of governing party complicated management of Iraq issue and irritated president, who canceled a planned visit to Ottawa in spring of 2003. At a deeper level, issue appears to have widened differences in values and outlook between two countries, and complicated Prime Minister Paul Martin's efforts to improve Canada-U.S. relations. Setting Stage It is generally agreed that relations between Canada and U.S. deteriorated in post-2000 period. Many observers attribute this to philosophical gulf between Chretien and Bush governments, implication being that dealings would improve when one or both of them was replaced. (3) Underlying this, however, were two factors that conditioned management of relationship and handling of Iraq war. The first was growing divergence between values and worldviews of Canadian and American publics in post-cold era, despite steadily increasing integration of two countries. Michael Adams has argued that Canadians became more socially liberal, skeptical of traditional authority, and supportive of a cooperative approach to resolution of international issues. Americans, by contrast, became more socially conservative, deferential to authority in a highly competitive national environment, and inclined to a survival of fittest view of world. (4) In international affairs this could be seen in Canadians' embrace of a multilateral, rules-based order and American view, which relied more on power and less on cooperation and expanding role of international law in pursuing U.S. interests abroad. (5) Chretien sometimes went out of his way to highlight Canada's policy differences with U.S., a practice he defended as good domestic politics. (6) The second factor was impact of attacks upon U.S. by al Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001. The attacks created a profound sense of vulnerability among Americans and elevated security to top of Washington's agenda. Bush made cooperation in war on terrorism litmus test of other countries' relations with U.S., saying Either you are with us, or you are with terrorists. (7) Chretien declared that while Ottawa would stand with U.S., the laws of Canada will be passed by Parliament of Canada. (8) Canadian officials took lead in drafting a plan to increase border security and facilitate low-risk trade and travel, which became basis of Smart Border Declaration, signed by Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, in December 2001. The Canadian government demonstrated its commitment by announcing a $7 billion (Cdn) program over five years. …