Can Virtue Ethics Derived from Neo-Aristotelianism be Perfectly Self-Explanatory

Abstract

As a result of the rise of neo-Aristotelianism in recent times, the discussion of 'virtue' has led to the question of whether virtue ethics can exist as a sound system. Prior to this, there was no normative standard for 'virtue', deontology ignored human nature, and utilitarianism focused more on instrumental reason, ignoring the plurality of the 'good'. Anscombe defined 'virtue ethics' in his Modern Moral Philosophy, and Nussbaum built on this by arguing that goodness does not depend only on the rationality of the actor, but also on morality and institutions, and Hesterhaus provided a normative interpretation of virtue ethics from an Aristotelian standpoint. However, as virtue ethics defines and regulates virtue ethics, it is difficult to form a logically coherent system, as either virtue ethics is more or less connected to other ethics, and there are even contradictions between specific claims.