Abstract
This chapter examines the role of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in deterrence and argues that potential adversaries will increasingly adopt “anti-access” strategies in order to deter the United States from projecting power within their geographic regions. If the United States can overcome these anti-access strategies, then such strategies no longer have any deterrent value. Furthermore, the US ability to project power, to deny the adversaries military victory, and to hold their most valuable assets at risk would likely exert a strong deterrent effect. This chapter argues that UAS are the most efficient way—and in some cases, the only way—to overcome anti-access challenges and thus should have a significant deterrent effect if they are acquired in sufficient numbers. Also, the ways in which UAS provide deterrent effects that are qualitatively different from manned airborne platforms, rather than simply providing “more of the same” due to greater endurance, are examined. Lastly, the pros and cons of UAS in “strategic deterrence” (i.e., nuclear delivery) and the role of UAS in deterring terrorists and insurgent movements are briefly considered.
Published Version
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