Abstract
To equilibrate the passenger distribution on the metro platform and carriage, a monetary incentive policy was explored in this paper; a discount on travel fare was provided to motivate metro passengers to queue for boarding in the noncrowded areas on the platform. The congested state is evaluated combined with the passenger distribution in the upcoming metro carriage. The utility of metro passengers and companies caused by the monetary incentive policy was analyzed, and the binary logit model was used to relate the utility to the passenger’s willingness to move from crowded areas to noncrowded ones. With data acquired from the questionnaire survey, a regression analysis was employed to explain the variation in passengers’ willingness to move as a function of discount level as well as personal and trip characteristics. The regression results show that effect of incentive discount is greater on female passengers and elderly passengers. A 10% discount can motivate most passengers aged over 40, and a 30% discount works on most female passengers. According to the different levels of passenger sensitivity, a particular discount can be determined to motivate a specific proportion of passengers to move and achieve the regulation of passenger distribution on the metro station platform and metro carriage.
Highlights
In the wake of the rapid increase in urban population, the congestion problem occurs on roads and in public transportation stations with large passenger flow
Nanjing South Railway Station is a transfer station of Metro Line 3 and Line 1. ere are 30 gates for passengers boarding and alighting in this metro station platform. e numbers in Figure 1 represent the identify number of boarding gates, and the blue circles represent metro passengers. e gate numbers around stairs are 6, 16, and 25
The distribution of passengers is disequilibrated even in peak hours. e disequilibrium of queue length in the metro station affects the distribution of passengers in metro carriage, leading to potential safety hazards and the Carriage at gate 27 & 26
Summary
In the wake of the rapid increase in urban population, the congestion problem occurs on roads and in public transportation stations with large passenger flow. Ere are 30 gates for passengers boarding and alighting in this metro station platform. Ey studied the equilibrium strategies and socially optimal strategies by a reward-cost structure and proved the effect of the proposed system under different information levels [21] These models mentioned above are not suitable to apply to the queue system on a metro station platform because there is no clear dividing line for each boarding queue. E study of queueing systems under a game-theoretic perspective was initiated by Naor [23] He considered a fully observable queueing system with one server where customers choose whether to balk or to join based on the service rewards and the waiting time [23]. Using the data collected from the questionnaire survey, the passengers’ preferences were analyzed using regression analysis, and the specific operation process of the monetary incentive policy for metro passengers was proposed
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