Can Minimal Autonomy Legitimate Coercive Institutions?

Abstract

The central thesis of Hassoun’s book states that coercive international institutions, in order to be legitimate, must ensure sufficient autonomy for those subject to them. While part i analyses the theoretical structure of this argument, part ii aims to assess its practical implications in the contexts of aid and trade. This effort to bridge the gap between theory and practice is welcome, even though the connection could be strengthened further. At the core of Hassoun’s theoretical stance lies the innovative idea of a sufficientarian account of the legitimacy of coercive institutions. This review suggests that, in contrast to a sufficientarian theory of the just distribution of material resources, relying on a sufficientarian view in the context of legitimacy is more controversial. Following the discussion of some more specific theoretical issues, the review closes with an evaluation of Hassoun’s proposal of a fair trade certification system for pharmaceutical companies.