Defense industrial policy in a changing international order: rethinking transatlantic burden-sharing

Abstract

ABSTRACT Though it is a core function of a sovereign state, governments do not navigate defense policy free from outside influences and constraints. The provision of external security requires armed forces to be adequately equipped but the distribution of material resources - defense-industrial capacity – for such equipment is not even but rather concentrated in the international system. How do alliance politics and defense-industrial policy connect? Our contribution highlights the material resources for military alliance effectiveness and emphasizes a strategic view of the relationship between these material factors and alliance burden-sharing. The sudden surge in demand for materiel resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed the defense-industrial fault lines within the transatlantic alliance. We outline existing dependencies and interdependencies, identify trade-offs and connections between industrial policy and defense spending, and formulate policy recommendations based on our findings. Taking a political economy of security perspective, these recommendations are aimed at a better understanding of how industrial politics and alliance stability are intertwined. They suggest pathways to a new and more stable transatlantic defense-industrial bargain in an era of increased great power conflict.