Can information transparency strengthen authoritarian accountability? An empirical study of open-government-information litigation in China (2008–2018)

Abstract

China’s 2008 national regulation on open government information (OGI) triggered a new wave of administrative litigation against governments calling for their release of classified information. Many scholars have debated the effects of OGI regulation and litigation on government accountability. Thus, this study examines 19,076 first instance OGI cases from 2008 to 2018 and proposes a typology of accountbility to explore whether and how information transparency can strengthen authoritarian accountability in China. The data suggests that information transparency boosts the amount of litigation and increases the plaintiffs’ winning rates against the state, which seems to fit the conventional-wisdom However, the interpretation of such patterns needs to incorporate two contingent conditions. First, China’s OGO litigation centers around urbanization-related disputes, such as housing demolition and land acquisition. The data futher reveals that urbanization stimulates OGI litigation but decreases the plaintiffs’ winning rates, and information transparency also has no impacts or even negative association with their winning rates, suggesting that OGI litigation mainly serves as a channel to release public grievances (as pressure-releasing accountbility). Second, our data also shows that plaintiffs’ winning rates are much higher when citing procedural clauses than content clauses in the OGI Regulation, suggesting authoritarian accountability is more procedural than substantive. Our findings offer a nuanced discussion on authoritarian information governance and accountability.