Abstract

This paper examines two objections to the infinitist theory of epistemic justification, namely “the finite mind objection” and “the distinction objection.” It criticizes Peter Klein’s response to the distinction objection and offers a more plausible response. It is then argued that this response is incompatible with Klein’s response to the finite mind objection. Infinitists, it would seem, cannot handle both objections when taken together.

Highlights

  • Infinitism is a theory of epistemic justification

  • I offer a more plausible response on behalf of Klein, but I go on to show that this response is incompatible with his response to the finite mind objection

  • Since infinitism requires that there be an infinite number of reasons available to us if we have a justification for a belief, an obvious problem arises: how can there be an infinite number of reasons available to a finite mind? As mentioned before, though Klein does not specify what it takes for something to be a reason, he thinks that a reason is at least a belief available to the subject

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Infinitism is a theory of epistemic justification. It claims that the structure of justificatory reasons is infinite and non-repeating. The theory contrasts sharply with other theories of epistemic justification such as foundationalism and coherentism. The theory contrasts sharply with other theories of epistemic justification such as foundationalism and coherentism Foundationalists and coherentists both agree that the structure of justificatory reasons is. As is well known, both theories have their problems Like these theories of epistemic justification, infinitism has been met with a variety of objections. Among these are the finite mind objection and the distinction objection. I argue that Klein’s response to the finite mind objection is incompatible with the most plausible response to the distinction objection. I explicate the finite mind objection and the distinction objection, and Klein’s responses to these two objections. In section five, I consider a possible reply to my argument

Infinitism and Its Motivation
Objections to Infinitism
The Finite Mind Objection
The Distinction Objection
Emergent Justification to the Rescue?
An Account of a Belief’s Being Justified?
A Dilemma for Infinitism
One Possible Reply
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call