Abstract
More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.
Highlights
More than 20 years of climate negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements
The number of key actors could be even further restricted to include only China and the United States. They account for 42% of global CO2 emissions [43] and more than 30% of world GDP [45]. If they were to agree on deep commitments to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions and on potent mechanisms to enforce compliance, they would likely have the economic strength to induce reluctant countries to join, for instance by implementing trade restrictions against nonparticipants
More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of climate agreements
Summary
More than 20 years of climate negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements. They account for 42% of global CO2 emissions [43] and more than 30% of world GDP [45] If they were to agree on deep commitments to reduce GHG emissions and on potent mechanisms to enforce compliance, they would likely have the economic strength to induce reluctant countries to join, for instance by implementing trade restrictions against nonparticipants. The United States, on the other hand, is not prepared to take on international GHG reduction commitments unless major developing countries, such as China, do so Given these key actors' dominant economies and their political positions on the climate problem, even an indirect (gradual) approach to establishing an international climate agreement with deep commitments and potent enforcement would likely be politically infeasible
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