Campaign Financing in Danish Referendums

Abstract

Direct democracy has been an important component of Danish democracy since the 1953 Constitution expanded the use of referendums. In particular, direct democracy has shaped Denmark’s relations with the European Union (EU), as all Danish referendums since 1978 have concerned aspects of European integration. The Danish electorate notably rejected both the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and full membership of the EMU in 2000, despite broad elite support for these proposals. This apparent disconnect between a largely pro-European political elite and an electorate, which is more evenly divided on issues of European integration, has raised the question of how public funding should be allocated in referendums on EU questions. Public funding constitutes the bulk of financing for referendum campaigns, yet there are no constitutional provisions or legal framework for determining its allocation. Instead, the distribution of funds is based on a political compromise in parliament prior to each referendum. Funding purely on the basis of seats in the national parliament would give the ‘Yes’ side a considerable financial advantage. We know from the literature on campaign spending in (mainly US) elections and referendums that campaign spending provides important information to voters, by reducing uncertainty, transmitting signals about the quality of the proposal, and in turn, influences outcomes.KeywordsEuropean UnionDirect DemocracyMaastricht TreatyCampaign SpendingConstitutional ProvisionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.